U.S. IPO Review│Tong Ying Group (TYZ.US): How Can a Bulk Commodity Trader with "Rising Revenue but No Profit Growth" Realize Its Nasdaq Dream?

Even though Tong Ying Group (TYZ.US) achieved a revenue scale of $644 million in 2025, its journey towards listing in the US has not been smooth.

Since first publicly filing with the SEC on February 21, 2025, and up to the third update of its prospectus on July 21, 2026, Tong Ying Group's IPO process has technically moved forward, but the company has still not disclosed detailed issue price or offering scale as of now. This suggests that the company’s IPO progress is significantly behind expectations.

Comparing with the typical timeline for US IPOs, the usual cycle from public filing to roadshow is 3-6 months. Even factoring in the overseas listing filing process with the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the overall cycle for most China-concept stocks is around 12-18 months. However, it has been over 18 months since Tong Ying Group’s public filing in November 2024, yet the filing is still incomplete, let alone the public pricing stage. The IPO schedule is obviously lagging behind market norms.

The sluggish progress is the result of multiple intertwined factors, including a backlog in the filing channel, Nasdaq’s new $25 million underwriting rule, and the company's fragile fundamentals. Tong Ying Group’s prolonged “no final pricing” situation mirrors the practical dilemma currently faced by Chinese small- and mid-cap companies with weak fundamentals under the overseas listing regulatory environment.

Business Structure Improves, Yet Stuck in a “Revenue Growth Without Profit” Quagmire

According to the prospectus, Tong Ying Group, founded in 2020, primarily engages in bulk commodity trading and supply chain consulting, purchasing chemicals, non-ferrous metals, and agricultural products upstream and selling to downstream clients. A notable feature of its business model: “two non-involvements”—no transportation, no warehousing.

The products of Tong Ying Group are delivered by suppliers to third-party warehouses designated by the company, and customers pick up the goods themselves. The company completes delivery merely by “designating warehouses + transfer of ownership,” playing the role of an “information matcher + funding bridge” intermediary.

This ultra-light asset strategy keeps operating costs low, but also means the company lacks an irreplaceable spot in the physical supply chain, with profits entirely dependent on upstream-downstream price differentials. In a market with highly transparent bulk commodity prices, the survival space for intermediaries is continuously squeezed, making thin margins an inescapable “structural fate.” The 2025 performance of Tong Ying Group, where business structure improved but profitability stagnated, is the best evidence of this.

According to the prospectus, in 2025, due to oversupply and weak demand, the industry-wide average price of PTA fell by 13-15%. Seizing this opportunity, Tong Ying Group proactively adjusted its business structure, reducing PTA resources while ramping up corn and expanding into a new product, EVA (ethylene-vinyl acetate). As a result, corn and EVA became the primary drivers of the company’s revenue growth.

Specifically, corn revenue grew by 210.4% year-on-year during the reporting period to $184 million, becoming the company’s second growth curve. Although EVA was a newly expanded product during the year, it already achieved $22.07 million in revenue, providing an effective boost to total revenue. Driven by both corn and EVA, Tong Ying Group’s total 2025 revenue grew by 8.19% to approximately $644 million.

In parallel with revenue growth, the company’s business structure saw obvious optimization. Income share from PTA (purified terephthalic acid) dropped from a dominating 84.3% in 2024 to 65%; corn’s share increased from 10% to 28.6%, and EVA accounted for 3.4%.

However, the growth in revenue and the business structure optimization did not lead to improved profitability. During the reporting period, Tong Ying Group’s net profit was only $815,000, almost unchanged from the same period in 2024, with a net margin of just 0.13%, basically at a fragile break-even point, highlighting the problem of “revenue growth without profit.”

Asset Structure and Revenue Scale Out of Balance; Equity-for-Survival May Be Inevitable

In reality, the dilemma Tong Ying Group faces is not limited to “revenue growth without profit” or weak profitability; a serious imbalance between asset structure and revenue scale is also a challenge the company must directly confront. According to disclosures, as of December 31, 2025, the company’s total assets were only about $3.83 million, yet it supported annual revenue of $644 million—an obvious feature of leveraged expansion. Among this, net fixed assets amounted to about $1.92 million, with virtually no heavy assets to use as financing collateral, and cash and cash equivalents on the books were only about $178,000.

For a bulk commodity trader handling over $600 million in annual transactions, this cash reserve is akin to “dancing on the knife’s edge”—should there be drastic price volatility, downstream bad debts, or supply chain interruptions, the company will lack enough buffer, with low tolerance and risk-resistance ability.

Secondly, SMEs are increasingly facing “dual compression” amid the bulk commodity cycle. On the pricing side, chemicals (PTA, EVA, ethylene glycol) are prone to significant volatility due to factors such as geopolitics, macro cycles, and capacity releases—posing clear challenges to business operations. In 2025, the average price of PTA fell 15.2% year-on-year, dragging down overall performance, and only with corn supplementing was revenue growth maintained.

On the competitive side, international giants (Glencore, Trafigura) dominate the market through scale and full-industry-chain layouts, leaving small and midsize traders structurally disadvantaged in resource acquisition and financing costs. How to build differentiated competitive advantages in this red ocean market and achieve sound development has become a problem that SMEs must face.

Furthermore, Tong Ying Group’s strategic transformation faces a double gap of “capability and capital.” To tell a more imaginative growth story and increase IPO valuation attractiveness, Tong Ying Group has outlined three strategic transformation pillars in its prospectus.

The first is platformization. The company plans to launch its CRMC (chemical raw materials B2B trading platform) system by the end of 2026 and achieve mature operations by 2027, upgrading traditional offline match-making trade to online, centralized supply chain management services. However, the company’s current net intangible assets are only $5,000, with virtually no technology foundation, so it may need to build the relevant team systems from scratch.

The second is warehousing heavy asset development. Tong Ying Group plans to build an automated, intelligent proprietary warehouse in 2027, attempting to extend from the “pure order-passing” model to physical logistics nodes, to grasp commodity ownership and warehouse premiums. The third is financial tool empowerment. The company plans to set up a spot/futures trading team in 2026, intending to hedge bulk commodity price fluctuation risks through spot-futures integration, trying to escape the fate of meager profit margins dictated by the market.

However, these transformation plans are in sharp conflict with the company’s weak financial status. Transformation directions like platformization, proprietary warehousing, and spot-futures integration all require substantial capital investment, but the company is strapped for cash and its own cash-generating ability cannot support such a transformation. Progress in strategic transformation must rely on the funds raised in this IPO.

However, Nasdaq's $25 million capital-raising rule for Chinese companies puts Tong Ying Group in a dilemma: to meet listing standards, the company will likely need to set a lower valuation and issue more shares, exchanging equity dilution for desperately needed capital—a game of “equity for survival” in essence.

Thus, Tong Ying Group is now “trapped by thin margins, constrained by lack of funds for transformation, and stuck at IPO pricing”—making it a typical example of small- and medium-sized Chinese companies with weak fundamentals that fall into structural predicaments under Nasdaq’s 2026 new rules for Chinese firms.