The ongoing escalation of conflict in the Middle East has further heightened shipping risks in the Strait of Hormuz, with threats from the Red Sea direction now beginning to extend towards Saudi energy facilities. On one hand, Iran claims that US naval forces have retreated significantly from its maritime borders, while on the other, it continues to strike vessels it deems “violating the rules.” Media estimates show that over the past two weeks, 24 ships have been attacked in the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding waters, including six on just one day last Sunday, marking the most severe attacks since the outbreak of the conflict.
According to Iranian media reports on Tuesday, the 13th local time, the Iranian Navy stated that a “violating” oil tanker, which had turned off its vessel tracking system and attempted to traverse the eastern waters of the Strait of Hormuz, was damaged and caught fire that day. Iran said the Navy had confirmed the ship’s identity, but withheld further details. Previously, citing remarks from an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson on Monday, Xinhua News Agency reported that Iran is currently reviewing the US response to its proposal to reopen the Strait, and that the conditions for reopening remain unchanged.
Another risk line originates from the Red Sea and its surrounding area. According to Global Times, on the 13th the Houthi movement declared Saudi Aramco’s oil facilities to be “legitimate targets,” warning employees and nearby civilians to evacuate. This means that regional energy risks not only stem from the key shipping corridor of the Strait of Hormuz, but could also extend further to Saudi oil production, refining, and export infrastructure.
According to CCTV News, on the 12th Iranian Navy Deputy Commander Faramarz Bermani stated that US naval forces had withdrawn significantly, moving away from Iran’s maritime boundaries. He said that US Navy warships, destroyers, and aircraft carriers had all pulled back, and that the Iranian Navy and other forces are developing new weapons systems aimed at opponents’ vulnerabilities, with some equipment already completed and ready for service.
Bermani also warned that if the United States “misjudges” the situation again, Iranian forces will respond, forcing US forces further away from Iran’s maritime borders. He further claimed that due to conflicts with Iran, US warships cannot access the Fifth Fleet base in Bahrain, which has become a “ghost town.” These claims currently reflect only Iranian military statements and cannot independently confirm actual changes in US naval deployments.
The US military has indeed carried out recent carrier rotations. According to CCTV News, the USS Lincoln returned to its home port of San Diego, California, on October 8, while the USS Bush previously deployed in the Middle East has also withdrawn. As of these reports, the only US carrier strike group in the Middle East conducting operations against Iran is temporarily the USS Washington; the newly dispatched USS Roosevelt carrier strike group departed the United States on September 27 and is not expected to reach Middle Eastern waters until the end of October at the earliest.
These deployment changes have coincided with Iran's claims of a US naval drawdown, but the rotation of carriers itself does not necessarily mean an overall reduction in US military pressure. The actual operational capability of US forces in the Middle East also depends on other vessels, land-based aviation, base support, and long-range strike forces.
According to the Financial Times, in the two weeks up to October 11, a total of 24 ships in the Strait of Hormuz and its surrounding waters were attacked, surpassing the previous high of 13 ships attacked during two weeks in early March. On a single day, October 11, six vessels were targeted, including refined fuel tankers, crude oil tankers, and an Indian container ship.
This series of attacks has caused a noticeable effect on actual shipments. The Financial Times cites related data stating that crude oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz fell from an average of 15.5 million barrels per day in September to just 2.9 million barrels per day on October 11—a drastic 81.3% drop from the September daily average. The Indian side also expressed concerns regarding the injury of its crew and the disappearance of two personnel.
Previously, despite ongoing regional conflict, oil tanker transport had shown signs of recovery, but the recent spike in attacks is dampening shipping companies’ willingness to enter the Gulf. Even with the lure of high shipping rates, the risks of attacks, casualties, rising insurance costs, and voyage delays may render some shipments unattractive.
For the crude oil market, the key variable is not only whether the Strait is completely shut but also how many ships are willing to enter the area, whether tankers can consistently load and transfer cargo, and whether export volumes can remain high. Should shipping risks continue to rise, the prospect of supply recovery may again be hindered.
Amid rising shipping risks, diplomatic communication between Iran and the United States continues. According to Xinhua News Agency on the 13th, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Baghaei stated on October 12 that Iran is reviewing the US’s latest feedback regarding Iran’s position and will immediately relay its stance to mediators upon completion. He emphasized that Iran’s conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz remain unchanged.
Previously, Iran had proposed, through mediators, a plan to reopen the Strait and halt hostilities. Baghaei also reiterated on the 12th that Iran is still reviewing the US response and, once evaluations are complete, will reply through mediators. Reuters reported, however, that the two sides still differ on the negotiation agenda: the US wants to address Iran’s nuclear issue as soon as possible, while Iran prioritizes discussions on Strait security and related conditions.
This means that diplomatic engagement has yet to translate into substantive improvement in shipping security. As long as differences remain on ceasefire arrangements, maritime blockades, and conditions for reopening the Strait, shipowners will find it difficult to conclude that transit risks are diminished just because negotiations are ongoing.
Beyond the Strait of Hormuz, energy risks from the direction of the Red Sea are also rising.
According to Global Times, a Houthi movement spokesperson on the 13th labeled Saudi Aramco oil facilities as “legitimate targets,” and warned employees and civilians near those facilities within Saudi Arabia to stay away from these locations.
Turkish Anadolu Agency further reported that the Houthis specifically mentioned Aramco’s headquarters in Dammam, Riyadh’s refining facilities, and Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport, stating that if Saudi attacks on Yemen’s capital Sanaa continue, these sites may become retaliation targets. These threats do not mean the facilities have already been attacked but do directly point to potential risks for Saudi oil companies and key infrastructure.
This development is worth watching: the Strait of Hormuz crisis primarily impacts crude and refined oil shipping routes, while threats to Saudi Aramco facilities could shift risks further along the chain to production, refining, and energy exports. Should these threats materialize into actual attacks, the market would face not just rerouted ships, higher insurance costs, and shipping delays, but also potential damage to production facilities and reduced supply capacity.
With Iran continuing to strike vessels, US carrier deployments shifting, and diplomatic negotiations still unresolved, growing threats from the Red Sea further increase uncertainty in Middle East energy supplies. For the international oil market, the combination of shipping corridor risks and threats to production infrastructure means that even with partial recovery in transport, regional supply could still suffer recurrent shocks.